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In the statement, the Cayman Islands government said in addition to supporting the G-8 agenda, these actions
conform to revised Financial Action Task Force recommendations on beneficial ownership and transparency.
“Furthermore, they build on Caymans' regime for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of
terrorism,” the government said.
Packman Sees Plan as Part of Continuing Effort
Kevin Packman, an attorney with Holland & Knight LLP in Miami, told BNA June 24 that he sees the action plan
as the Cayman Islands' latest effort in a continuing push to insist that it is cracking down on tax evasion.
Packman said the effort first began a few years ago when the island jurisdiction, along with Bermuda, was
labeled as a haven under the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act.
“If you were in one of these jurisdictions, the presumption was that you were up to no good,” Packman said.
“Instantly they pushed back. I see this plan as more of the same, where they're saying, ‘We're not doing
anything wrong.' ”
For More Information
Text of the action plan by the Cayman Islands government is online at http://www.caymanfinance.gov.ky/portal/
page?_pageid=4081,7430547&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL.
Text of the statement is online at http://www.gov.ky/portal/page?_pageid=1142,7431794&_dad=portal&_schema
=PORTAL.
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Hilary J. Allen is Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law. Her full article
“Let's Talk About Tax: Fixing Bank Incentives to Sabotage Stability” will be published in the forthcoming edition
of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law. A draft of the article can be accessed at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2190999.
Financial regulation and taxation are two fields of law that are notoriously complex and specialized. Given this
circumstance, it is perhaps not surprising that financial regulators often pay little attention to tax, and focus
instead on their own sphere of influence. Unfortunately, financial regulators ignore tax incentives at the peril of
financial stability.
In the United States, as in most countries around the world, tax rules prefer corporate debt over equity
(generally, interest payments on corporate debt are tax-deductible, while retained earnings and dividends
distributed to corporate shareholders remain taxable). 1 These tax rules have an outsized impact on the
stability of banks, as they encourage banks to fund themselves with debt rather than equity, which limits the
ability of banks to absorb losses. 2 When banks are unable to absorb losses in crisis situations, they tend to
sell off their assets in fire sales, which can depress asset prices system-wide, causing other banks to sell their
assets and creating a vicious deleveraging cycle. Avoiding the systemic ramifications of this deleveraging cycle
(which can include bank failure, and the broader economic contractions that result from restrictions in the
availability of credit) is the raison d'etre of regulatory capital regulation.
1 The IMF notes the “almost ubiquitous practice of allowing interest payments, but not the cost of equity finance, as a
deduction against [corporate income tax]”. Int'l Monetary Fund, Debt Bias and Other Distortions: Crisis-Related Issues in
Tax Policy 5 (Jun. 12, 2009) available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/061209.pdf.
2 “Because the value of a bank's equity equals the value of its assets less the value of its (non-equity) liabilities if asset
values fall, equity absorbs losses smoothly. Equity holders know that it is risky. Further, equity is perpetual. A bank does not
have to re-finance its equity funding periodically, as it does its debt funding (although it may need to add to it from time to
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time). So equity cannot ‘run’ in the way that other liabilities – in particular, deposits and short-term funding – can.”
Independent Comm. on Banking, Final Report: Recommendations, 86 (Sept. 2011)

“Regulatory capital regulation” refers to highly technical financial regulatory standards that require banks to fund
a minimum percentage of their activities with equity and equity-like instruments, rather than debt. 3 More
specifically, the most recent set of international regulatory capital standards (known as “Basel III”) 4 requires
banks to fund at least 8.0 percent of their “risk-weighted assets” with regulatory capital. 5 At least 4.5 percent of
risk-weighted assets must be funded with common shares and retained earnings (referred to in Basel III as
“Common Equity Tier 1”), 6 but 1.5 percent of a bank's risk-weighted assets may be funded with “Additional
Tier 1” instruments (such as perpetual noncumulative preference shares) and 2.0 percent may be funded with
“Tier 2” instruments (including some types of subordinated debt).
3 In the United States, these are codified in 12 C.F.R. 3. Regulatory capital regulation around the world is based on
international standards promulgated by an international body called the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the
“BCBS”).
4 Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems, BANK FOR INT'L
SETTLEMENTS (Dec. 2010, revised June 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p110625.htm; ( 96 BBR
1184, 6/28/11). The G20 nations have committed to national implementation of the principles of Basel III, although the
implementation process is just beginning.
5 Risk-weighting assets is a complicated process that involves assessing the perceived riskiness of assets held by the bank
and the perceived likelihood that a bank's contingent obligations will crystallize into actual obligations. These calculations
are often performed using banks' proprietary internal risk models.
6 In practice, banks must fund at least 7.0 percent of their risk-weighted assets with Common Equity Tier 1, or else face
restrictions on their ability to pay dividends and bonuses. Because of the added risk they pose, global systemically important
banks will be required to fund themselves with even higher levels of Common Equity Tier 1.

The Root Causes of Leverage Preference
Unfortunately, regulatory capital regulation is limited in its efficacy, and thus financial stability is compromised,
because it only treats the outward symptoms of banks' preference for leverage and does not engage with the
root causes of that preference. The same incentives that drive banks' preference for leverage in the first place
drive banks to arbitrage regulatory capital requirements, and there are a number of ways in which banks can do
this. First, because the amount of regulatory capital required is expressed as a percentage of the bank's “riskweighted assets”, banks can understate their risk-weighted assets (thus arbitraging the denominator of the
regulatory capital equation) by using internal models that underestimate the risk of the bank's assets, or by
using accounting gimmicks to transfer assets off balance sheet. Second, banks can arbitrage the numerator of
the regulatory capital equation by issuing lower-quality hybrid debt-equity financial instruments that have
enough equity-like attributes to count as regulatory capital, but are taxed like debt and are therefore cheaper
that Common Equity Tier 1.
Previous generations of these hybrid debt-equity instruments,
like trust preferred securities, have proved to be an ineffective
source of capital because they do not absorb losses as well as
among proposals for financial
Common Equity Tier 1, and because they create higher-ranked
regulatory reforms in that it would
claims which discourage new investors from investing in banks'
confer a benefit, rather than a cost,
Common Equity Tier 1 (holders of Common Equity Tier 1 will
only be residual claimants in bankruptcy). A new breed of
upon banks
hybrid instruments known as “contingent convertible bonds” or
“cocos” is being engineered to address the loss-absorbency
and debt overhang problems posed by trust preferred securities and their ilk, but new complex instruments like
cocos pose their own problems for financial stability. 7 Instead, the best way to ensure that banks are able to
absorb losses is for Basel III to dispense with hybrid regulatory capital, and mandate that regulatory capital
requirements be satisfied entirely with Common Equity Tier 1. 8

The ACE proposed here is unusual

7 For a discussion of the destabilizing potential of cocos, see Hilary J. Allen, Basel's Gone Cold on Cocos, But Is This a
Blessing in Disguise for Banks?, Banking Report (BNA), 09/27/2011 ( 97 BBR 532, 9/27/11 ).
8 This is a necessary, but not a sufficient reform – to the extent that banks are no longer able to arbitrage the numerator by
funding their activities with inferior capital, their (largely tax-driven) incentives to understate risk-weighted assets are
commensurably increased in importance. As such, this reform should be complemented by the introduction of the ACE
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discussed later in this Article.

At present, though, Basel III continues to allow hybrid instruments like cocos (and all other Additional Tier 1 and
Tier 2 instruments) to count as regulatory capital, even though it recognizes that they are inferior to Common
Equity Tier 1 in promoting financial stability. These are permitted because financial regulators accept that equity
is a more expensive source of funding than debt, and they fear that imposing too much cost on banks will cause
them to limit socially-desirable lending. But we should not simply accept at face value the notion that banks
prefer leverage – instead, we should ask the question, “why is equity more expensive for banks”? Two reasons
are routinely cited in response: that equity investors require a higher return than debt investors do, and that
equity is more information-sensitive than debt. While these statements are true as far as they go, it is wrong to
say that a funding mix that includes more equity vis-à-vis debt is more expensive than a more highly-leveraged
funding mix: a new book by Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig demonstrates that, all other things being equal, a
larger equity cushion will lower the required return on both bank equity and bank debt, as well as promote the
information insensitivity of bank debt, so that a bank's total cost of funding should remain constant even as it
replaces some debt funding with equity funding. 9 Concerns about return on equity and informational sensitivity
are therefore not the real impetus for banks' preference for leverage – instead, banks prefer leverage because
debt is subsidized by explicit and implicit government guarantees and by tax policies.
9 Anat Admati & Martin Hellwig, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT'S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT (2013).

Are Tax Incentives the Real Issue?
Looking at the countless articles, books and blog posts published on the topic since 2008, one could be forgiven
for thinking that the implicit subsidies conferred upon “too big to fail” banks are the main reason why large banks
prefer highly leveraged funding profiles. 10 But while “too big to fail” subsidies (and explicit subsidies like
deposit insurance and access to central bank borrowing) are certainly a reason why banks prefer debt, the
(admittedly limited) available data suggest that tax incentives have a much bigger impact on banks' funding
decisions than do any other government subsidies. 11 These tax incentives therefore need to be acknowledged
and addressed as a matter of priority. However, attempts to rationalize the treatment of debt and equity for all
corporations have generally failed to gain traction politically. This Article therefore proposes that we focus on
banks; institutions that provide credit and payment services that are vital to economic growth, as well as being
“the source of most of the externalized social costs of excessive leverage.” 12 Because of these unique
characteristics, banks already receive special treatment in the form of financial stability measures like deposit
insurance and central bank assistance. It is time to give serious thought to whether banks should receive
specialized tax treatment as well.
10 Despite a number of recent papers and speeches that claim that Dodd-Frank may have succeeded in ending “too big to
fail” in the United States, the broader consensus is that “too big to fail” subsidies persist after Dodd-Frank. See, for example,
Simon Johnson, The Case for Megabanks Fails, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2013) (available at http://economix.blogs.nytimes
.com/2013/05/02/the-case-for-megabanks-fails/).
11 Two studies have found that the average value of the “too big to fail” subsidy is in the order of 30 basis points, while a
further study found that it was in the order of 60 basis points. (See Dean Baker and Travis McArthur, The Value of the “Too
Big to Fail” Big Bank Subsidy, Center for Economic and Policy Research Issue Brief, 2 (September 2009); Kenichi Ueda and
Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for Systemically Important Financial Institutions, IMF
Working Paper 12/128, 4 (May 2012) and Viral V. Acharya, Deniz Anginer and A. Joseph Warburton, The End of Market
Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit State Guarantees (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961656) (Jan. 1,
2013)). These subsidies are cyclical, becoming more valuable in the depths of a crisis. Tax distortions, however, are
constant, and a study has suggested that in the G7 countries, these tax distortions affect funding decisions in the order of
hundreds of basis points (see Int'l Monetary Fund, Debt Bias and Other Distortions: Crisis-Related Issues in Tax Policy 11
(Jun. 12, 2009).
12 Victor Fleischer, Tax Reform and the Tax Treatment of Debt and Equity, Testimony before a Joint Hearing of the U.S.
House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means and the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, 11 (Jul. 13, 2011),
available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Fleischer%20Testimony.pdf.

Bank stability can be maximized by implementing an allowance for corporate equity or “ACE”, which would allow
a bank to fully deduct the cost of Common Equity Tier 1 (both dividends paid and retained earnings), just as the
bank is currently able to deduct its cost of debt. 13 Because this would ensure that Common Equity Tier 1 and
debt funding are taxed in the same way, there would be no real incentive to satisfy regulatory capital
requirements with complex hybrid instruments or other inferior capital: banks are only willing to sink costs into
developing complex hybrid debt-equity financial instruments because of the associated tax benefits, 14 and
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there would be no tax benefits associated with hybrids post-implementation of an ACE. In addition, incentives
for banks to understate their risk-weighted assets and deliberately hold insufficient capital would be significantly
reduced by the implementation of an ACE. 15
13 The tax paid by bank shareholders on dividends they receive from Common Equity Tier 1 would remain the same, as
would the tax paid by bank debt-holders on interest income.
14 For example, “Bankers like [cocos] only if [they are] capital for regulatory purposes and debt for tax purposes”. Viral V.
Acharya, Nirupama Kulkarni and Matthew Richardson, Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, 168 in Viral
V. Acharya et al. (eds), REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF
GLOBAL FINANCE (2011).
15 The introduction of this ACE would not obviate the need for regulatory capital requirements: the persistence of “too big to
fail” and other government subsidies for debt still provides some incentive for banks to be overly-leveraged, and these
incentives still need to be addressed by regulation. Furthermore, even with the best incentives in place, banks suffering
distress may not be able to maintain sufficient Common Equity Tier 1. In this context, regulatory capital requirements serve
as a supervisory tool – a bank's inability to comply with capital regulations sends a warning signal to regulators about the
bank's health.

Allowance for Corporate Equity as a Benefit
The ACE proposed here is unusual among proposals for financial regulatory reforms in that it would confer a
benefit, rather than a cost, upon banks, and therefore avoid the industry pushback that has stymied so many
other financial reform proposals. Here, we have a reform that would be both embraced by banks and improve
stability. And it would improve stability in a way that does not create moral hazard – other stability measures like
deposit insurance and central bank emergency lending can be perverse to the extent they encourage a “heads I
win, tails the taxpayer loses” mentality among bank managers. An ACE, however, creates incentives for better
bank behavior by reducing incentives for destabilizing leverage. The implementation of an ACE would also have
a number of salutary side-effects: it would save administrative resources because financial regulators (and tax
authorities) would no longer need to devote resources to evaluating new types of hybrid instruments to
determine whether they are debt or equity. 16 Furthermore, to the extent that the ACE reduces incentives for
banks to manipulate their accounting for risk-weighted assets, regulators will have an easier job monitoring
banks' compliance with regulatory capital requirements. Significantly, if banks no longer have such strong
incentives to congregate their assets in categories with low risk-weightings, the ACE will limit potentially
destabilizing herding of banks in those asset categories. 17 And finally, because regulatory capital requirements
apply only to banks and (at least at present) not to other types of financial institutions, the proposed ACE would
not be available to financial institutions other than banks. The institution of the ACE would therefore give
traditional banks an edge over their less-regulated competitors, which might start to reverse the migration of
funds to the more shadowy areas of the financial system.
16 In addition, the social waste associated with private sector development of hybrid instruments to arbitrage regulatory
capital requirements would be avoided: “Tens of millions of dollars a year in billable hours and investment banking fees are
devoted to analyzing whether particular financial products will or should be treated as debt or equity for tax purposes.” Victor
Fleischer, Tax Reform and the Tax Treatment of Debt and Equity, Testimony before a Joint Hearing of the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Ways and Means and the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, 10 (Jul. 13, 2011), available
at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Fleischer%20Testimony.pdf (97 BBR 124, 7/19/11 ).
17 Several commentators have expressed concern that regulatory capital requirements can be destabilizing to the extent
that they encourage banks to invest heavily in asset classes that have been assigned low risk-weightings, which can inflate
bubbles in those asset classes. This was the case with mortgage-backed securities issued prior to the Financial Crisis.
Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions: Redesigning the Basel Architecture,
44 (August 10, 2012) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2127749; see also Viral V.
Acharya, The Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III: Intentions, Unintended Consequences, and Lessons for Emerging Markets,
ADBI Working Paper Series 392, 13 (Oct. 2012) available at http://www.adbi.org/workingpaper/2012/10/29/5292.dodd.frank.act.basel.iii.emerging.markets/.

The benefits of implementing an ACE for banks are thus manifold. The chief objection to an ACE is that it will
entail a loss of revenue for taxing authorities. Currently, taxing authorities receive taxation income levied on
bank equity, which they would forgo if an ACE were to be implemented (although the revenue impact could
potentially be offset by the introduction of some type of financial institution or transaction tax). While it might be
expected that some of this revenue could be recouped at the investor level (i.e. investors receive dividends taxfree from banks, but must then pay tax on the dividends they receive), to the extent that shareholders are taxexempt or are located in another jurisdiction (as a sizable portion of investors are), there would be no
recoupment from investors of the foregone bank-level tax revenue. Models would need to be run to determine
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with any precision what impact the implementation of an ACE would have on revenue, but it is safe to say that it
would not be negligible. However, it is important that such expense be considered in the context of the
extremely high cost of financial instability – the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the United
States incurred an additional $7 trillion in government debt as a direct result of the recession following the
financial crisis of 2007-2008. 18
18 Simon Johnson, Where is the Volcker Rule?, N.Y. TIMES (December 15, 2011) (available at http://economix.blogs.n
ytimes.com/2011/12/15/where-is-the-volcker-rule/?ref=business).

***************
Following that financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank legislation created a new Financial Stability Oversight Council in
order to improve coordination and communication among the financial regulatory agencies about threats to
financial stability. 19 However, the conversation about financial stability needs to involve a broader group of
participants than just the financial regulatory agencies. Tax authorities have much to contribute to this
conversation, because as this Article has shown, financial instability is in many respects a tax problem that
requires a tax solution.
19 See Dodd-Frank Sections 111; 112.
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